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Abstract 
The adoption of domestic emissions trading schemes (ETS) can impose a heavy burden on 
energy-intensive industries. In particular, energy-intensive industries competing with foreign competitors 
could lose their international edge. Although the abatement of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in 
industrialized countries entails the reduction of their energy-intensive production, a corresponding 
increase in the production of energy-intensive goods in countries without CO2 regulations may lead to 
carbon ―leakage.‖ This paper examines the effects of various allocation methods for granting emissions 
permits in the Japanese ETS on the economy and CO2 emissions using a multiregional and multisector 
computable general equilibrium model. Specifically, we apply the Fischer and Fox (2007) model to the 
Japanese economy to address carbon leakage and competitiveness issues. We compare auction schemes, 
grandfathering schemes, and output-based allocation (OBA) schemes. We further extend the model by 
examining a combination of auctions and OBA. Though the auction scheme is found to be the best in 
terms of macroeconomic impacts (welfare and GDP effects), the leakage rate is high and the harm to 
energy-intensive sectors can be significant. OBA causes less leakage and damage to energy-intensive 
sectors, but the macroeconomic impact is undesirable. Considering all three effects—leakage, 
competitiveness, and macroeconomics—we find that combinations of auctions and OBA (with gratis 
allocations solely to energy-intensive, trade-exposed sectors) are desirable. 
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Output-Based Allocation of Emissions Permits  
for Mitigating the Leakage and Competitiveness Issues for the 
Japanese Economy  
Shiro Takeda, Toshi H. Arimura, Hanae Tamechika, Carolyn Fischer, and Alan K. Fox 
1. Introduction 
To address climate change issues, the European Union has adopted a domestic system, 
the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Other developed economies are now 
considering the adoption of domestic emissions trading schemes, and permit allocation methods 
have become an important issue. Many studies find that auctioning of permits is desirable in 
terms of both macroeconomic impact (effects on welfare and gross domestic product, GDP) and 
equity. However, auctioning permits would impose a heavy burden on energy-intensive 
industries. In particular, energy-intensive industries competing with foreign competitors could 
lose their edge and end up severely reducing production. In fact, because of the competitiveness 
issue, such industries have demonstrated strong opposition to the emissions trading schemes. 
Naturally, political support from industry, including energy-intensive industries, is essential to 
the adoption of an ETS. For this reason, to ensure smooth adoption of emissions controls, 
regulators must pay attention to the burden on energy-intensive industries and macroeconomic 
effects. 
Reasons for lessening the burden on energy-intensive industries go beyond politics. 
Although emissions regulations can cause such industries in developed nations to reduce 
production, they also could cause carbon leakage by shifting production to countries where 
energy efficiency is lower and regulations are looser, such as China and India. This shift 
weakens the benefits of carbon regulations in developed countries by increasing emissions in 
developing countries. Major contractions in energy-intensive industries in regulated countries 
could simply result in large-scale leakage to countries without tight regulations. In light of the 
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potential for such leakage, policymakers need to be cautious when placing a heavy burden on 
energy-intensive industries. 
The gratis allocation of emissions permits, as opposed to auctioning, has been proposed 
to ease burden on energy-intensive industries. In fact, EU ETS employs a grandfathering method 
in Phase II (2008–2012).
1 Recently, another type of free allocation method, output-based 
allocation (OBA), has attracted attention. Under OBA, emissions permits are distributed gratis to 
firms involved in international competition, based on their output. In the United States, the 
Lieberman-Warner and Waxman-Markey bills have proposed OBA to protect domestic 
industries that compete in international markets while preventing leakage.  
In response to the growing interest in OBA, Fischer and Fox (2007) employ a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model for a quantitative analysis of three methods: auctioning, 
grandfathering, and OBA in the United States. Their analysis suggests that OBA is somewhat 
effective in both helping energy-intensive industries and reducing leakage. Fischer and Fox 
(2010) extend this work by looking at specific combinations of OBA with either auctioning or 
grandfathering, to further explore the role of tax interactions as well as leakage. They find that, 
from a U.S. perspective, combining auctioning with OBA for energy intensive sectors—
particularly the trade-exposed ones—is more cost effective policy than auctioning alone. The 
rationale involves a combination of tradeoffs in tax interaction effects, carbon leakage, and 
terms-of-trade effects. However, it is not clear if this result would extend to any country 
undertaking a unilateral policy. Because full-fledged emissions trading may be adopted in Japan, 
a quantitative economic analysis of the different permit allocation methods is needed to provide 
information for policy decisionmaking. In this study, we apply the Fischer and Fox model to 
Japan to compare the various permit allocation methods. 
We construct a multiregional and multisector static CGE model with 14 regions and 26 
sectors. We assume that each country and region consists of three economic agents—households, 
firms, and governments—and that households and firms behave optimally. To analyze energy 
production activities in detail, we have designated two types of production functions compliant 
with the GTAP-EG model: a fossil fuel production function and a non–fossil fuel production 
function. We also assume that household utility depends on consumption and leisure—that is, 
households choose the supply of labor endogenously.  
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As emissions regulations, our analysis assumes a cap-and-trade scheme restricting total 
emissions. In addition, we assume that emissions controls are adopted by Japan, the United 
States, and the 27 EU member states, reducing emissions in these entities by 30 percent, 20 
percent, and 16 percent, respectively, from 2004 levels. We also assume that no scheme for 
international emissions trading is adopted; emissions permits are traded only internally, within 
each country or region. In addition, because the primary aim of this study is to analyze emissions 
trading in Japan, we assume that the United States and the EU-27 countries always allocate 
quotas using an auctioning method, with only Japan changing allocation methods. 
Following Fischer and Fox, we compare three allocation methods: auctioning (AUC), 
grandfathering (GF), and output-based allocation (OBA). GF and OBA allocate permits gratis. 
As opposed to GF, in which permits are allocated independently of firm behavior, permits are to 
firms’ outputs under OBA. Because this allocation method has the effect of subsidizing 
production, prices of outputs do not rise when emissions controls are imposed. This reduces 
negative effects caused by the tax-interaction effects
2 and mitigates the leakage and 
competitiveness issues. 
In theory, auction and gratis allocation (GF and OBA) are handled separately. In 
discussions of emissions controls, however, a combination of auction and gratis allocation 
methods has been proposed: some industries would receive permits gratis and others obtain 
permits through auctioning. For example, although plans call for the EU ETS to shift to an 
auctioning method in the future, gratis allocation would continue for industries exposed to 
―significant risk of carbon leakage,‖ such as the steel industry.
3 Such a hybrid allocation method 
is under consideration in Japan as well. Therefore, we also analyze gratis allocation to only 
certain industries. Specifically, we analyze two scenarios with auctioning for most industries but 
gratis OBA for (1) eight energy-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) sectors, electricity, and refined 
petroleum and coal products (Scenario AO-E), and (2) only EITE sectors (Scenario AO-ET). The 
sectors receiving gratis allocation have been selected according to criteria used in the U.S. Clean 
Energy and Security Act of 2009 (see Sugino et al. 2010). We also assume that the government 
would adjust labor taxes to keep real government expenditures at a fixed level. This revenue-
recycling effect reduces the distortion in labor markets. 
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Our model has many resemblances to but some important differences from Fischer and 
Fox (2007, 2010). First, whereas they use U.S. data for endogenizing labor supply in all regions, 
this study employs Japanese data for specifying the labor supply in Japan; furthermore, of 
importance for tax interaction effects, we note that labor tax rates are higher in Japan than in the 
U.S. Second, whereas Fischer and Fox (2007) use GTAP6 data with 2001 as the base year, like 
Fischer and Fox (2010) we use GTAP7 data with 2004 as the base year. Third, this study 
analyzes different hybrid allocation methods combining the auction and OBA methods 
likeFischer and Fox (2010). Fourth, unlike the Fischer and Fox studies, we assume that some 
major trading partners—notably the U.S. and the EU—already have emissions regulation in 
place, so the policy is not simply a unilateral one. But the main difference is our focus on the 
Japanese perspective, and how these climate policy options affect welfare, GDP, permit price, 
leakage, and production in each sector. 
In addition to Fischer and Fox, other researchers have analyzed emissions trading from 
the perspective of initial permit allocation methods. Parry et al. (1999) employ a static CGE 
model to compare emissions trading using auctioning and free allocation under conditions of 
taxation leading to distortions in the United States.
4 In another study focusing on the United 
States, Goulder et al. (1999) compare various controls on carbon dioxide emissions, including 
emissions trading. Employing a forward-looking dynamic CGE model, Jensen and Rasmussen 
(2000) compare the three allocation methods of auctioning, grandfathering, and an OBA system 
based on market share in emissions trading in Denmark. Böhringer and Lange (2005) analyze the 
effects of emissions trading in the EU (primarily Germany), under auctioning, OBA, and free 
allocation based on emissions volume (i.e., share of emissions). Finally, Dissou (2006) employs 
a forward-looking dynamic CGE model to analyze emissions trading in Canada under auctioning, 
grandfathering, and OBA. 
Those studies focused on ETS in Europe or North America. The competitiveness and 
leakage issues, however, may be more relevant for Japan because its industrial rivals, such as 
China and Korea, face no carbon caps and are geographically nearby. Thus, it is important to 
analyze the leakage and competitiveness issues under an ETS for the Japanese economy 
specifically. Analyzing an ETS for Japan is important from a European perspective as well. The 
EU is promoting an ETS for all countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development by 2020. For that purpose, it is essential that Japan have a domestic ETS as early 
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as possible. Unless the regulatory agencies can deal with the competitiveness and leakage issues 
to some degree, it will be extremely difficult for the Japanese government to adopt an ETS. This 
paper focuses on emissions trading in Japan by establishing parameters, data, and scenarios that 
provide useful information to assist Japanese policymakers in addressing the leakage and 
competitiveness issues.  
Taking the Japanese perspective, we find some subtle and some significant differences 
compared to earlier studies. The most important results of our analysis can be summarized as 
follows. First, our analysis shows that when allocation methods are compared for 
macroeconomic effects (i.e., welfare and GDP), the least disruptive method is AUC, followed by 
AO-ET, AO-E, OBA, and finally, GF. Conversely, the results show that OBA and AO-E are 
superior for controlling carbon leakages and minimizing the burden on domestic energy-
intensive industries. Still, in sensitivity analysis holding global emissions constant, the welfare 
ranking remains robust, indicating that the value of the leakage reductions does not offset the 
policy costs, which differs from previous studies for other regions. For example, Fisher and Fox 
(2010) showed that combining auctioning with OBA for energy intensive sectors is more cost 
effective policy than auctioning alone. The reason why we obtain different results for Japan may 
be attributed in part to the fact that the labor tax rates in Japan are higher than those in the U.S. 
Taking all results into consideration, AUC is the best allocation method if top priority is given to 
macroeconomic effects, but it causes overseas leakage and harms domestic energy-intensive 
industries. OBA causes the least leakage and the least harm to energy-intensive sectors, but its 
macroeconomic effects are undesirable. AO-ET provides balance: its macroeconomic effects are 
close to AUC and it simultaneously alleviates leakage effects and the burden on EITE sectors. 
2. Model and Data 
2.1 Model 
We construct a static CGE model with 14 regions and 26 sectors (Table1). The structure 
of the model is similar to that of Fischer and Fox (2007) and GTAP-EG (Rutherford and Paltsev 
2000).5 In each region, there are three types of agents: representative households, government, 
and firms. A household supplies capital, labor, land, and natural resources and then allocates its 
factor income to the purchase of goods and investment (savings). The utility of the household 
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depends on consumption and leisure, and it determines consumption and leisure so as to 
maximize utility, subject to a budget constraint. We assume that capital and labor are mobile 
within a region and that land and natural resources are sluggish factors.  
In the model, the tax rate on labor income is assumed to be determined endogenously so 
that real government expenditures are held constant. In addition to tax revenue, the government 
collects permit revenue, which is assumed to finance a reduction in the tax on labor income. 
Finally, firms produce goods with constant returns to scale technology and maximize profits 
using primary factors and intermediate inputs. To explain bilateral cross-hauling in the goods 
trade, we use the so-called Armington assumption: goods produced in different regions are 
qualitatively distinct (Armington 1969).  
We assume two types of production functions: the fossil fuel production function and the 
non–fossil fuel production function. Fossil fuel production activities include the extraction of 
coal (COA), crude oil (OIL), and natural gas (GAS). Production has the structure shown in 
Figure 1. Fossil fuel output is produced as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of 
natural resources and non–natural resources input composite. The non–natural resources input is 
a Leontief composite of capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. 
Non–fossil fuel production, including electricity (ELY) has the structure shown in Figure 
2. Output is produced with Leontief aggregation of nonenergy goods and an energy–primary 
factor composite. The energy–primary factor composite is a nested CES function of the energy 
composite and the primary factor composite. In addition, with respect to refined petroleum and 
coal products (P_C sector), we assume that OIL enters into the production function at the top-
level Leontief nest because most OIL is used as feedstock. Similarly, for the chemical products 
sector (CHM), we divide its energy use into feedstock requirements, which are treated as 
nonenergy intermediate inputs, and the remainder. For this, we use the feedstock ratio data of 
Lee (2008). 
The utility function for the representative household is a nested CES function shown in 
Figure 3. We assume that the representative household derives utility from leisure and aggregate 
consumption. Aggregate consumption is a CES aggregation of a nonenergy composite and an 
energy composite. The nonenergy composite is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of nonenergy goods, 
and the energy composite is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of energy goods. Finally, investment is 
fixed at the benchmark level. Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
7 
2.2 Benchmark Data and Parameter 
For the benchmark data, we employ the GTAP 7 database with 2004 as the base year. For 
CO2 emissions data, we generally follow the data provided by Lee (2008), except for the case of 
the CO2 emissions of the Japanese iron and steel sector (I_S), since her data are far below than 
the actual values. Because I_S is of great importance in the analysis of emissions regulation, we 
correct the data according to the data provided by 3EID (Nansai and Moriguchi 2009). For 
elasticity of substitution parameters in production functions, we generally use the values from 
Fischer and Fox (2007) and GTAP data; for Armington elasticity parameters, we use GTAP 
values. The elasticity of substitution between resource and nonresource inputs in fossil fuel 
sectors (e_es(j) in Figure 1) is calibrated from the benchmark elasticity of supply for fossil fuels, 
which is assumed to be two for all fossil fuels.
6 
One of the major parameters in our model is the elasticity of substitution between leisure 
and consumption in the utility function. For the Japan parameter, we use a value of 0.73, which 
is estimated by Hatano and Yamada (2007) from leisure and labor data in Japan. In addition, we 
derive the benchmark labor tax rate and leisure time for Japan from labor and tax data for Japan 
(ESRI 2007; MFPRI 2008; MHLW 2008).
7 To derive the leisure-consumption elasticity and the 
leisure time for other regions, we use the same approach as Fischer and Fox (2007). 
Data on the Japanese economy are also important for the modeling. Figure 4 depicts 
carbon intensity (tons of CO2 per $1,000 of output) for each sector in Japan. As expected, the 
iron and steel (I_S), nonmetallic minerals (NMM), nonferrous metal (NFM), chemical products 
(CRP), paper and pulp products (PPP), and transport sectors (OTP, ATP, WTP) have high carbon 
intensities. In addition, Japan’s fishery (FSH) sector is also carbon intensive. These sectors are 
likely to be significantly affected by carbon regulations. According to carbon intensity, we 
categorize I_S, FSH, NMM, OMN, CRP, NFM, and PPP as energy-intensive, trade-exposed 
(EITE) sectors. Table 2 shows the share of benchmark CO2 emissions in Japan, the United States 
and EU-27 (EUR). Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate Table 2. Figure 5 exhibits the sum of direct 
and indirect emissions; Figure 6 shows direct CO2 emissions only. Compared with the United 
States or EU-27, the share of emissions from Japan’s iron and steel sector (I_S) is much greater, 
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as is the share of Japan’s fishery sector (FSH). Figure 7 reports export and import shares for 
Japan by destination and source. It shows that China (CHN), Korea (KOR), and other Asian 
regions (ASI), which are not obliged to reduce CO2 emissions, are Japan’s major trading partners. 
This suggests that emissions regulation in Japan is likely to damage the competitiveness of 
Japanese EITE sectors against those in China, Korea, and the rest of Asia. 
3. Policy Scenarios 
Although our main purpose is to analyze emissions regulations in Japan, it is unlikely that 
Japan will implement regulations alone. So we assume that the United States and the EU-27 
impose emissions regulations in the baseline equilibrium, and then we analyze the incremental 
effects of regulation in Japan. The reduction rates (from 2004 levels) for Japan, the United States, 
and the EU-27 are 30 percent, 20 percent, and 16 percent, respectively. All these targets are 
translated from the Copenhagen pledges. We assume that a cap-and-trade scheme is introduced 
in the abating regions and that there is no international emissions trading. In addition, since the 
primary aim of this study is to analyze emissions trading in Japan, we assume that the United 
States and the EU-27 always allocate permits using auctioning with revenue recycling, while 
Japan considers alternate allocation methods. Across all policy scenarios, we assume that the 
representative household always obtains permits through the auction. 
To analyze the effects of various allocation methods on the Japanese economy, we set up 
five scenarios (summarized in Table 3). Scenario AUC is the auction scheme, in which all 
permits are allocated to industries by auction. GF is the grandfathering allocation, in which 
permits are allocated free of charge to industries independent of firms’ behavior. OBA is the 
output-based allocation scheme, in which the allocation of permits is determined by two stages: 
intra-industry allocation and inter-industry allocation. Intra-industry allocation is determined in 
proportion to firms’ output, and inter-industry allocation is determined by the baseline CO2 
emissions share. Moreover, we consider the combinations of auction and OBA schemes, which 
are divided into two cases. In Scenario AO-E, the energy-intensive sectors as a whole (EITE, 
electricity, and refining sectors) are given gratis allocation, and all other sectors receive permits 
by auction. In Scenario AO-ET, only EITE sectors are given gratis allocation. The details of the 
allocation schemes are presented in the next section. 
Under this framework, we analyze how allocation methods for emissions permits change 
the effects of the emissions controls on permit price, welfare, GDP, carbon leakage, production 
in each sector and trade, and other conditions. Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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3.1 Permit Allocation 
Previous studies have defined gratis allocation differently. For example, in some studies 
grandfathering is synonymous with gratis allocation, and others define grandfathering as one 
method of gratis allocation. To avoid confusion, we explain the details of the allocation methods 
in the following.  
In all cases, we consider a representative firm in sector i. Because firms produce goods 
under constant-returns-to-scale technology, we can define the unit cost function of production—
inclusive of emissions permit liabilities—as             , where   is the input price,    is input 
coefficient,      is the permit price and    is emission coefficient per unit of output. Let    be 
the output of the firm. Then      is the demand for permits in sector i, which is equal to the 
permits purchased (  ). 
3.1.1. Auction (AUC) 
When permits are auctioned, the firm’s profit is given by 
     (                 )  . 
where    is the market price for the goods produced. Because the firm does not receive gratis 
permits, the profit does not include the value of gratis permits. By the profit maximization 
condition with respect to output, we obtain                  , which means that the profit is 
equal to zero (      ). The government collects permit revenue      ∑      , and recycles it to 
reduce the tax on labor income. 
3.1.2. Grandfathering (GF) 
 Let    be the amount of gratis permits allocated to sector i. The profit in the 
grandfathering scheme is given by 
       (                 )             (1)   
where    is a fixed, lump-sum transfer. From this assumption, the first order condition for profit 
maximization is                  , which is the same as that of the auction scheme. As in the 
auction scheme, the demand for permits is given by     . However, the amount of permits 
purchased is                (the negative value means that the firm sells permits to other firms). 
The government does not collect permit revenue because it allocates all permits for free. 
                  implies that the firm obtains the excess profit 
           . Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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We assume that this excess profit is transferred to the household in a lump-sum fashion. 
The same profit maximization condition with the auction scheme means that the condition for 
determining firms’ behavior is the same in AUC and GF. 
3.1.3. Output-Based Allocation (OBA) 
Output-based allocation (OBA) is also a form of gratis allocation, distinct from GF in that 
the allocation of permits to a given firm is based on its current level of output, rather than a fixed 
amount. Let   
    be the amount of free permits per unit of output.8 Therefore, the firm’s profit 
becomes 
     (                 )           
     . 
With output-based allocation, the allocation to individual firms in a sector is updated 
based on their output shares within the sector. The more the firm produces, the more gratis 
permits it receives, and more profit. The link between gratis permits and a firm’s behavior 
(output) is the main characteristic of OBA. The profit maximization condition is given by 
               (       
   )  
Although firm’s cost increases as a result of CO2 emissions controls, both because of a change in 
input costs as well as permit liabilities, the increase in the price of the good is constrained by the 
existence of       
   . Hence, the increase in a good’s price in an OBA scheme is lower than in 
auctions and grandfathering. This weakens the tax-interaction effect induced by emissions 
control (Fischer and Fox 2010). The number of permits that the firm needs to purchase is 
     (       
   )   Although the allocation of permits within a sector is determined by output 
shares, the allocation of permits among sectors is set in proportion to the baseline emissions 
share.9 
In the OBA scenario, we assume this method of allocation is used economywide, except 
for final demand.                         
3.1.4. Auctions with Output-Based Allocation (AO-E and AO-ET) 
 In Scenarios AO-E and AO-ET, OBA applies to some industries and auctioning (AUC) 
with revenue recycling applies to the remaining industries. We consider two cases, because there 
                                                 
8   
    is regarded as constant by individual firms, but it is adjusted so that        
      holds for exogenous   . 
9 Some studies assume that permit allocations among sectors are based on OBA (their output shares) as well. See Böhringer and 
Lange (2005). Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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is not yet a consensus on which sectors will be assigned gratis allocations. In AO-E,  9 energy-
intensive sectors (electricity, EITE, and t refining sectors) are given OBA. In AO-ET, only EITE 
sectors receive OBA. The number of permits allocated free of charge decreases from AO-E to 
AO-ET. In the remainder of the paper, Scenario AO refers to both AO-E and AO-ET.                             
3.2 Volume of Gratis Permits 
Table 4 reports the initial allocations of gratis permits for the scenarios with full or partial 
OBA. In OBA, allocations within sectors are determined according to output level, but 
allocations at the sector level are set in proportion to each sector’s baseline direct emissions (i.e., 
indirect emissions from electricity are excluded). The same rule applies to AO, but the number of 
sectors with gratis allocation is limited. The total number of gratis permits is 725.7 MtCO2 (87 
percent of total emissions quotas) in OBA, and it falls to 193.7 MtCO2 (23 percent) in AO-ET. 
Table 4 does not report allocations in GF because sector allocation has no effect on the results; 
the rents are passed through to the representative consumer/shareholder.  
4. Simulation results 
4.1 Macroeconomic Effects  
We now explore the simulation results for the five allocation methods. We begin with the 
macroeconomic effects on Japan. In the following, the baseline equilibrium with abatement 
action only in USA and EUR is called business-as-usual (BaU). Table 5 summarizes the results 
across all scenarios. A permit price (U.S. dollars per metric ton of CO2) is the highest in OBA, 
followed by AO-E, AO-ET, AUC, and GF, in descending order. Permit prices range from a high 
of $132.6 in the OBA scenario to a low of $93.9 in the GF scenario; thus, permit prices differ 
across allocation methods by around $40. The highest permit price occurs under OBA because 
carbon-intensive sectors get relatively higher subsidies, and the lack of incentives to conserve or 
find alternatives means that the other sectors or households must reduce their emissions more, 
and this requires a higher permit price. The permit price under AO comes closer to that under 
AUC (OBA) when the share of auctioned permits increases (decreases). Although the permit 
price in AO-E is the almost the same as in economywide OBA, the permit prices in AO-ET are 
very close to AUC. This suggests that permit price depends on whether the high-emitting energy 
sectors—electricity (ELY) and refined petroleum and coal products (P_C)—receive output-based 
allocation. 
We report the impacts on Japanese welfare (in percent equivalent variation) for reaching 
the domestic target, excluding any valuation of differences in global emissions. These impacts Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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are negative for all allocation methods. The negative welfare effects are the smallest in AUC, 
followed by AO-ET, AO-E, OBA, and GF. Although welfare loss in OBA is very close to that in 
GF, welfare loss in AO-ET is close to that in AUC. This also indicates that the gratis allocation 
to the electricity and petroleum and coal product sectors makes a large difference in the results. 
GDP loss is the smallest in AUC, followed by AO-ET, AO-E, OBA, and GF in ascending order. 
The ordering of allocation methods by GDP loss is the same as by welfare loss, but the 
dispersion of GDP losses is larger (as the value of changes in leisure are not included). Taking 
the above results together, we can conclude that in terms of macroeconomic effect for a given 
domestic target, AUC is the most desirable allocation method. This result contrasts to that in 
Fischer and Fox (2010), who found a preference for AO-ET. The difference may be attributed in 
part to the higher labor tax rates in Japan, which strengthen the tax interaction effect, and also to 
different terms of trade effects. In sensitivity analysis, we will compare the welfare costs of 
policies meeting a common global target, which holds the environmental benefits consistent 
across scenarios. 
Because welfare and GDP depend on consumption, let us examine the change in 
consumption. The dampening effect on consumption is the smallest in AUC, followed by AO-ET, 
AO-E, OBA, and GF. This ordering is the same as that for welfare and GDP effects, which are 
closely linked to the effects on consumption. The AUC scenario yields an increase in 
consumption. In the AO-ET scenario, the decrease in consumption is small. The reason for the 
positive or small negative changes in consumption is the revenue-recycling effect. Because 
permit revenue is used to lower the labor tax, an AUC that generates a large amount of permit 
revenue increases the real wage for the representative household. As a result, labor supply, which 
is at an insufficient level in BaU, increases. This increase in labor supply raises labor income, 
and consumption increases as a result. In the AUC scenario, the government collects a permit 
revenue of roughly US$82 billion, and the revenue-recycling effect lowers the labor tax rate by 
six percentage points (from 50 percent in BaU to 44 percent). This leads to increases in the real 
wage and employment by 0.92 percent and 0.89 percent, respectively, which raises labor income 
and total income by 1.82 percent and 0.04 percent, respectively. As a consequence, consumption 
increases by 0.04 percent. Permit revenue for AO-ET is smaller than that for AUC because fewer 
permits are auctioned (permit revenue is roughly US$67 billion for AO-ET). Nevertheless, the 
revenue-recycling effect reduces the decrease in consumption under Scenario AO-ET (–0.25 
percent for AO-ET). Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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Conversely, we observe a large decrease in consumption under grandfathering. This is 
attributed to the following two reasons. First, because permits are allocated to sectors for free, 
there is no revenue-recycling effect under GF.
10 Second, the negative tax-interaction effects 
become more apparent in GF than in other scenarios. Compared with OBA, which has an effect 
similar to a production subsidy, the output price increases more under GF. This increase in 
output price lowers real wages and thereby decreases the labor supply (which is already 
insufficient). The reason for the large decrease in consumption under GF is the small revenue-
recycling effect and the large tax-interaction effect. 
Under OBA, the revenue-recycling effect is as small as in GF. However, the increase in 
output price under OBA is smaller than under GF because OBA allocates gratis permits to firms 
in proportion to their output and is thus equivalent to a production subsidy. As a result, the tax-
interaction effect is smaller in OBA than in GF, and therefore the decrease in consumption is 
smaller in OBA. 
4.2 Carbon Leakage 
The carbon leakage rate differs among our five allocation methods.
11 Table 5 shows that 
the leakage rate is the smallest with OBA, followed by AO-E, AO-ET, GF, and AUC. Except for 
GF, the leakage rate decreases with the number of sectors given gratis permits. OBA and AO-E 
have a smaller leakage effect; AUC and GF have more leakage. The leakage in AO-ET is 
between that of AUC and AO-E. We can conclude that in terms of leakage, OBA and AO-E are 
the most effective and AO-ET is the second best. 
Table 6 reports the leakage rates to nonabating regions, by sector. It shows the 
contribution of each sector to the overall leakage rate in each allocation scenario. For example, 
the iron and steel sector (I_S) accounts for 4.14 percentage points of the total leakage rate of 
20.58 percent under the AUC scenario. The leakage in the ELY and EITE sectors is large with 
all allocation methods. Although Japan does not trade electricity, the leakage in electricity is 
large because carbon regulation in Japan lowers international fossil fuel prices, which induces 
other regions to generate more electricity. Table 7 summarizes the leakage rates for EITE sectors 
                                                 
10 Strictly  speaking,  there  is  a  small  revenue-recycling  effect  because  permits  are  always  allocated  by 
auction to households. 
11 The carbon leakage rate is defined as the ratio of total additional CO2 emissions in regiongs other than Japan to total CO2 
emissions abated by Japan. For example, when the decrease in CO2 emissions by Japan of 1 MtCO2 leads to the increase in CO2 
emissions by the nonabating countries of 0.3 MtCO2, the leakage rate is 30 percent. Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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using another calculation of leakage—the ratio of the increase in emissions from each sector in 
foreign countries to the decrease of CO2 in the same sector of the Japanese economy. With this 
notion of leakage, nonferrous metal (NFM) and other mining (OMN) have very high leakage 
rates. One should note, however, that the volume of emissions from OMN is relatively small in 
Japan (Table 2). These two leakage tables show that all three OBA scenarios are highly effective 
at reducing leakage in the EITE sectors, particularly iron and steel, but other sectors are less 
responsive. Carbon leakage among non-energy-intensive and transportation sectors increases in 
the AO scenarios (Table 6).  
Table 8 breaks out the contribution of each nonabating region to the overall leakage rate 
in each allocation scenario. For instance, China accounts for 6.43 percent of the total leakage rate 
of 20.58 percent under the AUC scenario. In all scenarios, the leakage rates to CHN, ASI, and 
FSU are high. In addition, the change in allocation schemes has the largest effect on the leakage 
to CHN. This indicates that China is the most important region when we analyze the leakage 
from Japan. 
4.3 Effects of CO2 Emissions Abatement on Each Sector 
The main reason for adopting gratis allocation methods is to lessen the burden on energy-
intensive industries. We now turn to the effects of allocation methods on the sectors. Although 
many possible indicators could represent differences in sectoral burdens, we analyze effects on 
output, exports, and imports. 
Table 9 summarizes percentage changes in output from BaU. It shows that output in 
many sectors tends to decrease. The rate of the output decrease, however, differs by allocation 
method. With GF and AUC, the rates of decrease in output for energy-intensive sectors—in 
particular, ELY and I_S—are very steep. With OBA and AO, however, the decline in output for 
energy-intensive sectors is significantly mitigated. With OBA and AO-E, the rates of decrease in 
output of energy-intensive sectors as a whole become smaller. With AO-ET, which gives no 
gratis permits to the electricity sector, the reductions in output are mitigated only in EITE sectors, 
and to a lesser extent than the other OBA scenarios, since upstream electicity production is 
receives no offsetting subsidies.  
Table 10 presents the percentage change in exports and imports. Because Japan does not 
trade ELY, its value is zero. Table 10 shows that the effects on the exports of individual sectors 
differ across allocation schemes. With AUC and GF, exports of energy-intensive sectors—in 
particular, I_S, FSH, NMM, OTP, and ATP—decrease significantly. However, this effect is 
mitigated with OBA and AO-E, particularly in I_S and NMM and somewhat in FSH. Similarly, Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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AO-ET can mitigate the decline in exports of EITE to a large extent. Harmful effects on imports 
are generally smaller than those on exports except for fossil fuels, but imports for EITE sectors—
in particular, I_S, FSH, and NMM—significantly increase with AUC and GF. The effects on 
imports are also mitigated with OBA and AO. 
We analyzed how the effects of CO2 emissions abatement differ by the allocation 
methods in terms of sectoral output, exports, and imports. Overall, our numerical results suggest 
that AUC and GF cause significant harm to energy-intensive sectors and that OBA and AO can 
mitigate the effect to a large extent.  
4.4 Effects on Other Regions 
This subsection examines the effects of emissions abatement on China, Korea, and other 
Asian countries, all of which have strong trade relationships with Japan. To do so, we examine 
changes in these countries’ output and CO2 emissions by sector. In the following, we look only at 
AUC, OBA, and AO-ET because GF is inferior to other allocation methods in all aspects and 
because the effects of AO-E and OBA are similar.  
Table 11 represents the changes in output in Asian countries, as a percentage of their BaU 
production. It shows that emissions regulations in Japan generally have small effects except on 
EITE sectors—in particular, I_S. The increase in the output of EITE sectors is less under OBA 
and AO-ET because OBA and AO restrain the relocation of energy-intensive production to Asia. 
Non-energy-intensive sectors face smaller but opposite effects: their output is larger under OBA 
and AO than under AUC, which generally causes decreases in production in China and Korea.  
Table 12 reports changes in CO2 emissions in Asian countries. With the exception of 
extractive resources, emissions increase nearly across the board. With AUC, CO2 emissions from 
the ELY and EITE sectors increase to a large extent, especially in China; the change in 
electricity emissions is in part due to increased demand from EITE sectors, and in part due to 
fuel price changes that leave carbon intensive energy cheaper in nonabating countries. Roughly 
half of the increase in CO2 emissions from EITE sectors is counteracted under OBA and AO-ET 
(somewhat less for ASI), indicating that OBA and AO-ET are effective in preventing carbon 
leakage to these regions.  
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
In implementing the simulation, we made various assumptions, some of which may be 
less sound than others. We therefore conducted a sensitivity analysis to examine how the results 
change when the assumptions are modified. The assumptions we consider here are (1) the Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in utility; (2) Armington elasticity; (3) 
the benchmark value of fossil fuel supply; and (4) the case of fixed global emissions, in which 
the Japanese emissions target is endogenously set depending on the leakage to other regions.
12 
The sensitivity analysis shows that although the quantitative results are significantly different in 
some cases, the qualitative results are not greatly affected in most cases. In particular, we find 
that the allocation policy rankings do not change when global emissions are held constant. (To 
save space, we do not present the numerical results here. The complete results of the sensitivity 
analysis are available from the authors upon request.)  
5. Conclusions 
Using a static CGE model with 14 regions and 26 sectors, this paper examines the effects 
of various permit allocation methods for a Japanese domestic ETS. Our analysis assumes that 
Japan, the United States, and the EU-27 countries implement a cap-and-trade scheme to reduce 
CO2 emissions by 30 percent, 20 percent, and 16 percent, respectively, from 2004 levels. With 
these models and assumptions, we have explored how allocation methods affect Japan. We 
compare five allocation methods: auctioning (AUC), grandfathering (GF), output-based 
allocation (OBA) and the two combined schemes of output-based allocation and auction (AO-E 
and AO-ET). 
The most important results of our analysis are summarized as follows, from the 
perspective of the Japanese economy. First, GF is inferior to all other allocation methods from all 
three perspectives: macroeconomic effect, leakage, and burden on domestic energy-intensive 
sectors. There are two reasons for GF’s poor performance: it has a small positive revenue-
recycling effect, and it has a strong negative tax interaction effect. 
AUC is the most desirable allocation method in terms of macroeconomic effects. AUC, 
however, not only leads to large leakage rates but also has considerable negative effects on 
domestic energy-intensive sectors. The result that AUC is the best in terms of welfare is contrast 
to Fisher and Fox (2010), which showed that combining auctioning with OBA for energy 
intensive sectors is more cost effective policy than auctioning alone. Although there are many 
possible reasons for the different result, it may be attributed in part to the fact that the labor tax 
                                                 
12 See Table A-1 in the Appendix for the case of a constant global emission scenario. In this scenario, the emission reduction 
target of the Japanese economy is reduced in OBA because of the smaller leakage rate. Overall, the effect is reduced. The ranking 
of the allocation methods, however, does not change. The difference across various allocation methods becomes smaller. One can 
also point out that the burden on EITE is reduced as expected.  Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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rates in Japan are higher than those in the U.S. OBA and AO-E generally have similar effects, 
which is interesting to note since implementing OBA among all the non-energy-intensive and 
transportation sectors would be practically challenging. These two scenarios perform best in 
terms of leakage and effects on energy-intensive sectors. However, they are inferior in terms of 
macroeconomic effects. AO-ET is relatively desirable in terms of macroeconomic effects 
because its welfare effects are similar to those under AUC and because the GDP effect is far 
superior to that under GF, OBA, and AO-E. In addition, leakage under AO-ET is only slightly 
inferior to that under OBA and AO-E. With respect to sectoral effects, the damage to EITE 
sectors is relatively small in AO-ET, though the effects on the electricity sector are large, as they 
are with AUC. 
To summarize, if macroeconomic effects are the top priority, AUC is the most desirable 
allocation method. If leakage and competitiveness issues are most important, OBA and AO-E are 
desirable. However, for all three issues, AO-ET is most preferable: its macroeconomic effect is 
close to that under AUC, and at the same time it has low leakage and a low burden on EITE 
sectors. Economists often evaluate policy solely on the basis of macroeconomic consequences 
and therefore tend to support auctioning of permits. Taking the other issues in account as well, 
however, other allocation methods may be more desirable. Indeed, our quantitative analysis 
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Tables and Figures 
Table1. Regions and sectors 
 
Symbol Regions Symbol Sectors
USA United States FSH Fishery
CAN Canada OMN Other mining
JPN Japan PPP Paper-pulp-print
OOE Other OECD CRP Chemical industry
EUR EU27 NMM Non-metallic minerals
FSU Former Soviet Union NFM Non-ferrous metals
OEU Other Europian regions I_S Iron and steel industry
CHN China (+ Taiwan) ELY Electricity
KOR Korea P_C Petroleum and coal products
IND India COA Coal
BRA Brazil OIL Crude oil
ASI Other Asia GAS Gas
MPC Mexico + OPEC OTP Transport nec
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Table 2. Share of benchmark CO2 emissions in Japan, United States, and European 
Union, by sector (percentage direct + indirect emissions) 
 
Notes: Values in parenthesis are share of direct emissions. 
Direct emissions from ELY are allocated to other sectors as indirect emissions. 
 
Table 3. Scenarios 
 
   
FSH 1.6 (1.6) 0.1 (0.1) 0.4 (0.3)
OMN 0.4 (0.3) 0.5 (0.0) 0.6 (0.3)
PPP 3.2 (1.5) 3.7 (1.8) 3.6 (1.5)
CRP 10.4 (7.2) 8.4 (4.3) 8.5 (4.4)
NMM 3.6 (2.4) 2.6 (1.9) 5.7 (4.3)
NFM 1.3 (0.3) 1.7 (0.5) 1.9 (0.6)
I_S 20.0 (16.6) 2.7 (1.4) 5.3 (3.2)
ELY 1.7 (0.0) 3.1 (0.0) 2.4 (0.0)
P_C 1.8 (1.3) 5.3 (4.6) 2.6 (1.9)
COA 0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (0.0) 0.3 (0.1)
OIL 0.0 (0.0) 0.7 (0.6) 0.4 (0.4)
GAS 0.0 (0.0) 1.2 (1.0) 0.5 (0.4)
OTP 19.8 (18.5) 20.0 (19.3) 23.9 (22.5)
WTP 2.1 (2.0) 1.0 (0.9) 4.1 (4.0)
ATP 1.4 (1.3) 11.1 (11.0) 5.7 (5.7)
AGR 1.7 (1.6) 1.2 (1.2) 3.3 (2.6)
FPR 2.0 (1.2) 3.0 (1.7) 4.4 (2.6)
TWL 0.2 (0.1) 0.8 (0.3) 1.3 (0.6)
LUM 0.1 (0.0) 0.7 (0.3) 0.6 (0.2)
TRN 0.1 (0.0) 1.1 (0.4) 1.3 (0.5)
OME 1.5 (0.2) 1.3 (0.4) 1.7 (0.7)
OMF 3.7 (0.9) 1.7 (0.5) 2.0 (0.8)
CNS 1.4 (1.3) 0.4 (0.4) 1.0 (0.8)
TRD 4.7 (1.6) 9.1 (1.7) 5.5 (2.2)
CMN 0.6 (0.2) 0.4 (0.0) 0.5 (0.1)
SER 16.8 (8.5) 18.1 (4.8) 12.6 (4.6)
SUM 100.0 (68.7) 100.0 (59.1) 100.0 (65.4)
EUR JPN USA
Symbol Scenario
AUC All permits are allocated by auction.
GF Gratis allocation by grandfathering.
OBA Intra-industry allocation is based on OBA and inter-industry allocation is based on
baseline emissions share.
AO-E OBA for EITE, electricity, and petroleum and coal products sectors and auction for
other sectors.
AO-ET OBA for EITE sectors and auction for other sectors.Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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Table 4. Initial allocation of permits in Japan (MtCO2) 
 
Notes: Gratis is total amount of gratis permits. 
Auction is total amount of permits by auction. 
Total is total emissions cap. 
OBA AO-E AO-ET
FSH 10.2 10.2 10.2
OMN 1.7 1.7 1.7
PPP 9.5 9.5 9.5
CRP 46.8 46.8 46.8
NMM 15.9 15.9 15.9
NFM 1.8 1.8 1.8
I_S 107.8 107.8 107.8
ELY 280.2 280.2 0.0
P_C 8.2 8.2 0.0
OTP 120.0 0.0 0.0
WTP 13.2 0.0 0.0
ATP 9.0 0.0 0.0
AGR 10.6 0.0 0.0
FPR 7.5 0.0 0.0
TWL 0.4 0.0 0.0
LUM 0.0 0.0 0.0
TRN 0.1 0.0 0.0
OME 1.4 0.0 0.0
OMF 6.1 0.0 0.0
CNS 8.2 0.0 0.0
TRD 10.5 0.0 0.0
CMN 1.1 0.0 0.0
SER 55.3 0.0 0.0
Gratis 725.7 482.2 193.7
Auction 107.5 351.0 639.5
Total 833.2 833.2 833.2Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
23 
Table 5. Macroeconomic indicators in Japan 
 
Notes: Percentage change from BaU unless otherwise indicated. 
VNPR is value of net permit revenue (US$ billion). 
AUC GF OBA AO-E AO-ET
CO2 emissions -30.48 -30.48 -30.48 -30.48 -30.48
Permit price ($/tCO2) 97.91 93.85 132.58 129.70 104.47
Welfare  -0.28 -0.54 -0.52 -0.44 -0.34
Real GDP -0.07 -0.86 -0.66 -0.48 -0.24
Consumption  0.04 -1.34 -1.01 -0.65 -0.25
Export  -3.10 -3.64 -2.96 -2.89 -2.86
Import  -2.87 -3.43 -2.75 -2.46 -2.52
Terms of trade 0.79 0.90 0.73 0.89 0.80
VNPR (bil.$) 81.58 78.20 14.26 45.52 66.81
Labor tax rate (%) 44.35 50.00 50.57 48.02 45.75
Wage rate 0.92 -2.29 -1.38 -0.59 0.27
Labor supply  0.89 -0.48 -0.01 0.31 0.63
Labor income  1.82 -2.77 -1.39 -0.29 0.89
Total income  0.04 -1.34 -1.01 -0.65 -0.25
Leakage rate (%) 20.58 20.36 15.27 15.31 16.92Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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Table 6. Leakage to nonabating regions, by sector (percentage) 
 
Note: HH is representative household. 
 
AUC GF OBA AO-E AO-ET
FSH 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06
OMN 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.10
PPP 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12
CRP 1.79 1.78 1.46 1.33 1.51
NMM 1.36 1.36 0.93 0.90 1.08
NFM 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.34
I_S 4.14 4.10 1.16 1.07 1.63
EITE 7.85 7.79 4.07 3.80 4.84
ELY 10.09 10.08 8.23 7.53 8.52
P_C 0.24 0.21 0.06 0.12 0.25
COA -0.46 -0.46 -0.53 -0.53 -0.51
OIL -0.50 -0.52 -0.57 -0.55 -0.53
GAS -0.86 -0.85 -0.95 -0.94 -0.92
FENE -1.82 -1.83 -2.04 -2.02 -1.97
OTP 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.45 1.33
WTP 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.33 0.22
ATP 0.74 0.68 0.49 1.19 0.97
TRANS 2.01 1.91 1.71 2.97 2.51
AGR 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.15
FPR 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.12
TWL 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.06
LUM 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01
TRN 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02
OME 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.10
OMF 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.28 0.27
NEINT 2.49 2.38 2.59 3.80 3.26
CNS 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05
TRD 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.14
CMN 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
SER 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.18
SVCES 0.29 0.28 0.43 0.40 0.37
HH 1.45 1.45 1.94 1.68 1.66
SUM 20.58 20.36 15.27 15.31 16.92Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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Table 7. Alternative expression of leakage to nonabating regions, by sector (percentage) 
 
Notes: HH is representative household. 
The leakage rate for sector i here is defined as the ratio of the increase in CO2 emissions 
from sector i in nonabating regions to the decrease in CO2 emissions from sector i in 
Japan. 
 
Table 8. Leakage to nonabating regions (percentage) 
 
AUC GF OBA AO-E AO-ET
FSH 9.63 7.21 9.01 8.89 9.40
OMN 103.11 100.68 70.74 68.42 83.61
PPP 8.29 8.38 11.51 10.53 10.40
CRP 33.38 33.28 27.76 25.78 28.57
NMM 66.52 67.17 45.69 44.55 52.37
NFM 220.74 228.45 264.00 248.93 258.37
I_S 25.44 25.44 7.98 7.46 11.29
EITE 30.51 30.47 17.09 16.11 20.33
AUC GF OBA AO-E AO-ET
CHN 6.43 6.37 3.86 3.70 4.46
KOR 1.09 1.07 0.81 0.81 0.86
ASI 3.33 3.28 2.83 2.89 3.04
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAN 0.29 0.28 0.22 0.26 0.28
OOE 1.52 1.51 1.35 1.38 1.49
EUR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FSU 2.59 2.57 1.78 1.76 1.95
OEU 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09
IND 1.25 1.26 1.12 1.05 1.13
BRA 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.16
MPC 2.21 2.18 1.94 2.02 2.17
ROW 1.52 1.51 1.15 1.21 1.29
SUM 20.58 20.36 15.27 15.31 16.92Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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Table 9. Change in output (percentage) 
 
 
AUC GF OBA AO-E AO-ET
FSH -3.7 -4.3 -3.6 -3.4 -2.7
OMN -2.1 -2.3 -1.1 -1.2 -1.6
PPP -0.4 -1.3 -1.0 -0.7 -0.6
CRP -3.4 -4.0 -2.0 -1.5 -2.1
NMM -2.3 -2.6 -1.1 -1.0 -1.4
NFM -3.2 -3.6 -2.2 -1.7 -4.2
I_S -11.2 -11.4 -2.7 -2.3 -4.0
EITE -4.2 -4.7 -1.9 -1.5 -2.2
ELY -12.7 -13.1 -4.7 -4.5 -12.8
P_C -15.2 -15.5 -15.1 -15.3 -15.4
COA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OIL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FENE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OTP -1.9 -2.8 -1.4 -2.9 -2.3
WTP -2.9 -3.2 -1.8 -4.4 -3.6
ATP -6.4 -7.1 -3.0 -10.5 -8.2
TRANS -2.3 -3.1 -1.5 -3.6 -2.9
AGR -0.6 -1.4 -1.4 -1.9 -1.2
FPR -0.3 -1.4 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6
TWL 1.7 0.3 -1.3 -0.8 0.1
LUM 0.5 0.1 -1.1 -1.1 -0.6
TRN -0.1 -0.8 -1.6 -0.9 -0.1
OME -0.3 -0.9 -1.8 -1.1 -0.9
OMF -0.7 -1.4 -1.6 -1.3 -1.4
NEINT -0.7 -1.5 -1.5 -1.6 -1.2
CNS -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
TRD 0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 0.1
CMN 0.5 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 0.1
SER 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1
SVCES 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
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Table 10. Change in exports and import (percentage) 
 
 
AUC GF OBA AO-E AO-ET AUC GF OBA AO-E AO-ET
FSH -17.7 -15.5 -13.8 -13.9 -12.4 7.5 5.3 5.0 5.2 4.9
OMN -3.7 -3.5 -2.3 -3.6 -3.9 -5.9 -6.3 -2.0 -1.5 -3.1
PPP -2.1 -2.6 -2.6 -1.8 -3.6 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.2 1.4
CRP -9.2 -9.1 -3.7 -3.0 -5.1 2.9 2.1 0.5 0.5 1.4
NMM -13.0 -12.9 -3.8 -4.1 -7.4 7.4 6.8 1.5 1.8 3.8
NFM -8.6 -8.7 -3.5 -2.8 -11.3 1.3 0.7 -0.4 -0.3 1.9
I_S -44.1 -43.1 -6.0 -5.9 -13.6 35.0 33.1 2.0 2.1 7.1
EITE -15.6 -15.4 -4.1 -3.6 -7.3 3.6 2.8 0.3 0.4 1.5
ELY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
P_C -8.4 -8.1 -1.6 -1.7 -9.0 -7.4 -7.8 -8.8 -8.9 -6.7
COA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -39.4 -39.3 -39.3 -39.2 -39.9
OIL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -15.2 -15.4 -14.8 -15.0 -15.3
GAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -41.9 -41.6 -42.9 -42.5 -42.7
FENE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -22.2 -22.3 -22.1 -22.1 -22.4
OTP -10.9 -11.0 -5.7 -18.8 -15.0 2.2 1.2 1.0 4.6 3.7
WTP -2.7 -2.8 -1.6 -5.0 -3.7 -2.1 -2.4 -1.4 -2.7 -2.3
ATP -10.0 -10.1 -4.4 -16.3 -12.9 2.5 1.3 0.9 4.8 3.8
TRANS -5.1 -5.3 -2.7 -8.9 -6.9 1.2 0.3 0.3 2.8 2.1
AGR -2.5 -1.0 -3.7 -8.0 -5.6 0.6 -1.1 0.5 2.3 1.7
FPR -0.9 -0.7 -3.9 -5.8 -4.0 0.2 -1.1 0.9 1.9 1.5
TWL 4.9 3.6 -2.4 -1.9 0.1 -1.1 -2.0 0.1 0.4 0.1
LUM 4.4 3.8 -2.8 -3.4 -0.9 -1.6 -1.8 0.3 0.4 -0.3
TRN 0.0 -0.7 -2.4 -1.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.5 0.3 0.0
OME -0.6 -1.4 -2.9 -1.8 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.4
OMF -1.3 -2.0 -3.3 -3.2 -3.3 0.1 -0.1 0.7 0.9 0.9
NEINT -1.0 -1.7 -2.8 -2.9 -2.2 0.0 -0.6 0.6 1.1 0.8
CNS 1.9 1.1 -1.8 -2.0 -0.3 -1.0 -0.6 1.0 1.1 0.1
TRD 5.2 4.2 -1.6 -1.1 0.9 -1.7 -2.5 0.2 0.5 0.0
CMN 5.6 5.2 -1.6 -0.7 1.4 -2.1 -3.0 0.1 0.1 -0.5
SER 5.1 4.7 -1.7 -1.1 1.0 -2.6 -3.2 0.0 0.1 -0.8
SVCES 4.7 4.0 -1.7 -1.3 0.8 -2.3 -2.9 0.1 0.2 -0.6
CGD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Table 11. Change in output in China, Korea, and other Asia (percentage) 
 
CKA output (default) 
AUC OBA AO-ET AUC OBA AO-ET AUC OBA AO-ET
FSH 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.58 0.48 0.43 0.09 0.08 0.07
OMN 0.52 0.09 0.23 0.68 0.09 0.27 0.12 0.07 0.21
PPP -0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.39 0.39 0.40
CRP 0.41 0.19 0.24 0.75 0.41 0.47 1.47 0.89 1.00
NMM 0.46 0.14 0.25 0.70 0.15 0.34 0.95 0.54 0.67
NFM 0.14 0.06 0.37 -0.03 -0.21 0.10 0.90 0.58 1.19
I_S 2.36 0.37 0.69 4.30 0.37 1.06 5.84 1.44 2.20
EITE 0.78 0.19 0.32 1.53 0.29 0.54 1.37 0.70 0.88
ELY 0.38 0.19 0.23 0.67 0.32 0.37 0.76 0.60 0.63
P_C 0.32 0.05 0.15 0.28 -0.03 0.12 0.24 0.08 0.20
COA -1.13 -1.32 -1.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.74 -3.98 -4.00
OIL -0.72 -0.90 -0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.67 -0.93 -0.83
GAS -1.40 -1.54 -1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.80 -4.14 -4.05
FENE -0.98 -1.16 -1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.27 -2.56 -2.48
OTP 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.28 0.14 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.24
WTP 0.08 -0.04 0.06 -0.37 -0.36 -0.33 0.11 0.03 0.18
ATP 0.34 0.05 0.50 0.38 0.08 0.52 0.65 0.39 0.76
TRANS 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.32
AGR -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
FPR -0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
TWL -0.31 -0.07 -0.12 -0.26 -0.05 -0.12 0.32 0.31 0.25
LUM -0.30 -0.08 -0.18 -0.18 -0.08 -0.08 0.02 0.26 0.10
TRN -0.10 0.14 -0.05 -0.74 -0.05 -0.35 -0.12 0.38 0.07
OME -0.16 0.28 0.05 -0.52 0.01 -0.17 0.03 0.73 0.39
OMF -0.15 0.13 0.08 -0.46 -0.16 -0.10 0.14 0.66 0.54
NEINT -0.11 0.08 0.03 -0.38 -0.05 -0.11 0.12 0.33 0.27
CNS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
TRD -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.12
CMN -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.09
SER -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04
SVCES -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.06
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Table 12. Change in CO2 emissions in China, Korea, and other Asia (MtCO2) 
 
CKA CO2_d (default) 
AUC OBA AO-ET AUC OBA AO-ET AUC OBA AO-ET
FSH 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
OMN 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.06
PPP 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.17
CRP 1.43 1.03 1.12 0.09 0.07 0.07 1.69 1.29 1.37
NMM 2.55 1.48 1.85 0.24 0.15 0.18 1.52 1.17 1.29
NFM 0.11 0.09 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.10
I_S 5.89 1.33 2.05 0.67 0.12 0.22 1.31 0.44 0.59
EITE 10.32 4.21 5.54 1.05 0.40 0.52 4.85 3.23 3.62
ELY 13.47 9.56 10.43 2.20 1.70 1.74 5.24 4.78 4.90
P_C 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.12
COA -1.32 -1.54 -1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
OIL -0.33 -0.41 -0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07
GAS -0.93 -1.02 -1.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.32 -0.35 -0.34
FENE -2.58 -2.97 -2.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.44 -0.49 -0.48
OTP 0.38 0.35 0.43 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.49 0.50 0.56
WTP 0.25 0.16 0.25 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.09 0.15
ATP 0.14 0.07 0.19 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.41 0.29 0.49
TRANS 0.77 0.58 0.87 0.28 0.21 0.31 1.01 0.88 1.21
AGR 0.15 0.25 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04
FPR 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.16 0.16
TWL -0.06 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.08
LUM -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
TRN 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
OME 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.10
OMF 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.34 0.32
NEINT 0.99 1.42 1.52 0.31 0.29 0.37 1.59 1.69 1.94
CNS 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
TRD 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.23 0.23
CMN 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
SER 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.33 0.35 0.35
SVCES 0.29 0.42 0.38 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.57 0.63 0.61
HH 1.00 1.44 1.28 0.32 0.41 0.37 0.22 0.45 0.38
SUM 23.50 14.09 16.29 4.00 2.96 3.15 12.17 10.34 11.10
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Figure 1. Production function of fossil fuel sectors 
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Figure 3. Utility function 
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Figure 4. CO2 intensity in Japan (tCO2/US$1000) 
 
Source: GTAP7 data. 
Figure 5. Share of benchmark CO2 emissions, by sector (percentage direct emissions + 
indirect emissions)  
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Figure 6. Share of benchmark CO2 emissions, by sector (percentage direct emissions) 
 
Figure 7. Export and import shares of Japan (percentage)  
 
Note: TRN is global transport sector.  
Source: GTAP7 data. Resources for the Future  Takeda et al. 
33 
Appendix 
See following pages.  




1.  Model 
 
1.1.  Notes  
  All taxes except labor and lump-sum taxes are omitted for notational simplicity. 
  All functions are written in calibrated share form. 
  All reference prices are omitted for notational simplicity. 
 
1.2.  Zero profit conditions 
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Π  
     1     
     
 	–          
 
 ∉  
–    
        
    
       
   1     
     
          
 
        0  
       
  
Price index of primary factors    ∉       
   
            
 
 ∈  
   
      
  
       
 
 ∈  
    




    
  
      
    
 
Production of fossil fuels ( ∈    )  
Π  
       
  	
 		    
     ,  
       
 
   1
     
         
     
 
 ∈  
       
      
  
 ∉  
       
      
  
 ∈  
 




    
 
 0  
       
 





   		    






   
        ,  
          				
   1     





	   
   	    ,  
         		
   1     
    		         
       
        
     
 
      






      







      
 0  
      
 
Price of energy intermediate goods     ∈       
    
         
       
       
           
    
 
Allocation of sluggish factor    ∈       
Π  
            
      





    
     
   0        
    
 
Armington aggregate for intermediate inputs   
Π   
         
           
     
      
 
   1      
      




    
 
 0        
    
 
Armington aggregate for private consumption   
Π  
        
          
     
      
 
   1     
      




    
 
 0       
    
 
Armington aggregate for government expenditure   
Π  
        
          
     
      
 
   1     
      




    
 
 0       
    
 
Aggregate imports across import regions   
Π  
   	    
           
      





    
 





CIF price of imports   
    
        
       
 
 
            
    
 
Household utility   
Π 
   	   
       
  	  
      
  
   1    
     




    
  
 0        
 
Price of leisure   
  
        
  	 1    
       
    
 
Household consumption demand   
Π 
   	   
       
 	  
          1    
    
       
 
      0        
 
Household nonenergy demand   
Π 
    	   
         
     
  
 ∉  
 0         
 
Household energy demand   
Π 
    	   
           , 
    
    , 
  
     
      
  
 ∈  
 0         
 
Price of consumption goods     ∈      
   
        
       
      
          
    
 
Global transport sector   
Π 
      
         
     
 
 
 0       
   
 
Government expenditure   
Π 
      
        
    
  
 
 0        
 
Labor supply   
  
             
 Π 
 
   
       







1.3.  Market clearance conditions   
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1.4.  Income 
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1.5.  Notations 
 





OIL Crude  oil 
GAS Gas 
COA Coal 





 ,   Sectors and goods 
 ,   Regions 
EG  All energy goods: OIL, GAS, COA, P_C, and ELY 
FF  Primary fossil fuels: OIL, GAS, COA 
EN  Emissions source: OIL, GAS, COA, and P_C 
LQ  Liquid fuels: GAS and P_C 
MF  Mobile factors: labor and capital 
SF  Sluggish factors: land and natural resources 
FL  Factors except labor: capital, land and natural resources 
ET  Regions participating in international emissions trading 
CGD Index  of  investment  goods 
NRS  Index of natural resources 
 
Activity variables 
Symbol  Description 
      Production in sector    and  region   
     Aggregate energy input in sector    and  region   
    
    Allocation of sluggish factors in region        ∈       
    
    Armington aggregate for good    used  for  sector   in  region   
   
    Armington aggregate for good     used for private consumption in region    
   
    Armington aggregate for good     used for government expenditure in region    
     Aggregate imports of good    in  region   
    Household utility in    
    Aggregate household consumption in region    
     Aggregate household non-energy consumption in region    
     Aggregate household energy consumption in region    
   
   Global transport services 
    Government expenditure in region    
  






Symbol  Description 
   
    Output price of goods     produced in region   
   
    Price index of VA for sector    in  region   ∉      
   
   Price of aggregate energy for sector    in  region     ∉      
    
    Price of energy intermediate goods    for  sector   in  region       ∈    , ∉      
   
   Import price aggregate for good     imported to region    
    
    CIF price of goods    imported  from   to  region   
    
    Price of Armington good    used  for  sector   in  region   
   
    Price of Armington good     used for private consumption in region    
   
    Price of Armington good     used for government expenditure in region    
  
   Price of aggregate household consumption in region    
  
    Price of aggregate household energy consumption in region    
  
    Price of aggregate household non-energy consumption in region    
  
   Price of household utility in region    
   
    Price of energy consumption goods    in  region   
   
    Price of primary factor    in  region   
    
     Price of sluggish factor    for  sector   in  region   
  
    Price of leisure in region    
  
   Price index of government expenditure in region    
  
   Price of global transport service    
  
     Price of emissions permit for region    
 
Cost shares 
Symbol  Description 
      Share of intermediate good    for  sector   in  region       ∉      
   
     Share of VAE aggregate for sector    in  region       ∉     
   
   Share of energy in VAE aggregate for sector    in  region       ∉     
    
    Share of primary factor     in VA composite for sector    in  region      	 ∉     
   
   Share of natural resources for sector    in  region       ∈     
    
    Share of primary factor    for  sector   and  region       ∈     
    
    Share of non-resource intermediate inputs    for  sector   and  region       ∈     
   
     Share of coal in fossil fuel demand by sector    in  region       ∉     
   
     Share of electricity in overall energy demand by sector    in  region   
    
     Share of liquid fossil fuel   in liquid energy demand by sector   in region      ∉
   ,   ∈         
    




    
    Share of domestic variety in Armington good    used  for  sector   of  region   
   
    Share of domestic variety in Armington good     for private consumption in region    
   
    Share of domestic variety in Armington good     for government expenditure in region    
    
    Share of imports of good    from  region   to  region   
  
    Share of leisure in utility of region    
  
   Share of composite energy input in household consumption in region    
   
    Share of non-energy good     in non-energy household consumption demand in region    
   
    Share of energy good     in energy household consumption demand in region    
   
   Share of supply from region     in global transport sector    
   
   Share of Armington good     in government expenditure in region    
   
    Share of energy good     in energy household consumption demand in region    
 
Income and policy variables 
Symbol  Description 
    Household income in region    
  
   Government income in region    
  
   Labor tax rate in region    
  
   Lump-sum tax in region    
   
   Value of permit revenue in region    
  
   Lump-sum tax in region    
 ̅   Exogenous level of government expenditure in region    
      ,   Exogenous level of investment in region    
   
   Output rebate rate of sector    in  OBA 
   
     Unit allocation for sector    in  OBA 
   
     Initial allocation for sector    in  OBA 
 
Endowments and emissions coefficients 
Symbol  Description 
    Aggregate endowment of primary factor    for  region   
    Balance of payment deficit or surplus in region      ∑     0     
  2   Carbon emission limit for region    
    
      Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel     used for sector    in  region       ∈     
   
      Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel    used for private consumption in region  
   ∈     
       Amount of global transport service     required for shipment of goods    from  	to    
 





Symbol  Description 
    Elasticity of transformation for sluggish factor allocation.         0.001 
      1  
  
    Substitution between primary factors in VA composite of production in 
sector    
GTAP values 
      Substitution between energy and VA in production.  0.5 
  
   Substitution between natural resources and other inputs in fossil fuel 
production calibrated consistently to exogenous supply elasticities      
      2  
      2  
      2  
      Substitution between electricity and fossil fuel aggregate in production  0.1 
      Substitution between coal and liquid fossil fuel composite in production  0.5 




   Substitution between import aggregate and domestic input  GTAP values 
  
   Substitution between imports from different regions  GTAP values 
  
    Substitution between leisure and consumption in utility   
  
   Substitution between  fossil fuel composite and  non–fossil fuel 
consumption aggregate in household consumption 
0.5 
 
2.  Sensitivity analysis 
 
Scenario  Description 
default Benchmark  case 
cgco2  Emissions limit on Japan is endogenously adjusted so that global CO2 emissions 
are held constant at level under AUC   
eos_a_l  Large values of Armington elasticity (original values × 2) 
eos_a_s Small  values  of  Armington elasticity (original value / 2) 
eos_cl_l  Large values of EOS between consumption and leisure (original values × 2) 
eos_cl_s  Small values of EOS between consumption and leisure (original value / 2) 
eos_ff_l  Large values of fossil fuel supply elasticity (original values × 2) 










Table A-1. Global emissions constant case: Japan 
 
    
JPN (cgco2)
AUC GF OBA AO‐EA O ‐ET
CO2 emissions ‐30.48 ‐30.39 ‐28.61 ‐28.62 ‐29.14
Permit price ($/tCO2) 97.91 93.33 114.74 112.57 95.16
Welfare ‐ 0.28 ‐0.54 ‐0.44 ‐0.37 ‐0.30
Real GDP ‐0.07 ‐0.86 ‐0.56 ‐0.40 ‐0.21
Consumption  0.04 ‐1.34 ‐0.84 ‐0.53 ‐0.20
Export ‐ 3.10 ‐3.63 ‐2.71 ‐2.65 ‐2.69
Import ‐ 2.87 ‐3.42 ‐2.52 ‐2.27 ‐2.38
Terms of trade 0.79 0.90 0.67 0.81 0.76
VNPR (bil.$) 81.58 77.85 14.91 42.01 62.38
Labor tax rate (%) 44.35 50.00 50.31 48.11 46.02
Wage rate 0.92 ‐2.28 ‐1.14 ‐0.45 0.28
Labor supply  0.89 ‐0.48 0.01 0.28 0.58
Labor income  1.82 ‐2.75 ‐1.12 ‐0.17 0.87
Total income  0.04 ‐1.34 ‐0.84 ‐0.53 ‐0.20
Leakage rate (%) 20.58 20.35 15.38 15.42 16.92
Output of EITE ‐4.16 ‐4.67 ‐1.75 ‐1.41 ‐2.11
Output of ELY ‐12.68 ‐13.02 ‐4.55 ‐4.38 ‐11.97
Output of P_C ‐15.23 ‐15.41 ‐13.51 ‐13.67 ‐14.27
Output of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output of TRANS ‐2.31 ‐3.09 ‐1.36 ‐3.18 ‐2.62
Output of NEINT ‐0.70 ‐1.46 ‐1.35 ‐1.45 ‐1.08
Output of SVCES 0.21 ‐0.56 ‐0.50 ‐0.26 ‐0.05
Output of manufacturing ‐1.94 ‐2.61 ‐1.82 ‐1.50 ‐1.54
Export of EITE ‐15.55 ‐15.30 ‐4.02 ‐3.55 ‐6.92
Export of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of P_C ‐8.38 ‐8.02 ‐1.51 ‐1.65 ‐8.29
Export of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of TRANS ‐5.15 ‐5.23 ‐2.43 ‐7.93 ‐6.40
Export of NEINT ‐0.99 ‐1.69 ‐2.54 ‐2.60 ‐2.03
Export of SVCES 4.66 4.01 ‐1.40 ‐1.05 0.76
Export of manufacturing ‐3.48 ‐4.05 ‐2.83 ‐2.27 ‐2.60
Import of EITE 3.64 2.82 0.36 0.41 1.40
Import of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Import of P_C ‐7.37 ‐7.81 ‐7.76 ‐7.88 ‐6.24
Import of FENE ‐22.15 ‐22.20 ‐20.33 ‐20.38 ‐21.18
Import of TRANS 1.17 0.29 0.31 2.42 1.96
Import of NEINT ‐0.03 ‐0.62 0.53 0.96 0.78
Import of SVCES ‐2.26 ‐2.85 0.10 0.19 ‐0.55
Import of manufacturing 0.54 ‐0.01 0.19 0.30 0.56




Table A-2. Large values of Armington elasticity (original values × 2) 
  
JPN (eos_a_l) 
AUC GF OBA AO‐EA O ‐ET
CO2 emissions ‐30.58 ‐30.58 ‐30.58 ‐30.58 ‐30.58
Permit price ($/tCO2) 91.93 88.37 131.59 127.90 101.85
Welfare ‐ 0.32 ‐0.57 ‐0.56 ‐0.48 ‐0.38
Real GDP ‐0.06 ‐0.80 ‐0.64 ‐0.47 ‐0.23
Consumption ‐ 0.04 ‐1.34 ‐1.05 ‐0.70 ‐0.30
Export ‐ 2.80 ‐3.32 ‐2.70 ‐2.45 ‐2.54
Import ‐ 2.99 ‐3.59 ‐2.80 ‐2.30 ‐2.51
Terms of trade 0.34 0.40 0.40 0.55 0.46
VNPR (bil.$) 76.60 73.63 13.96 44.75 65.07
Labor tax rate (%) 44.73 50.00 50.57 48.06 45.87
Wage rate 0.80 ‐2.21 ‐1.41 ‐0.63 0.21
Labor supply  0.88 ‐0.40 0.03 0.33 0.64
Labor income  1.68 ‐2.60 ‐1.39 ‐0.30 0.86
Total income ‐ 0.04 ‐1.34 ‐1.05 ‐0.70 ‐0.30
Leakage rate (%) 25.45 25.10 15.97 16.40 19.34
Output of EITE ‐6.20 ‐6.59 ‐2.06 ‐1.50 ‐2.98
Output of ELY ‐12.74 ‐13.10 ‐4.76 ‐4.52 ‐12.78
Output of P_C ‐15.91 ‐16.11 ‐15.28 ‐15.48 ‐16.28
Output of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output of TRANS ‐2.86 ‐3.58 ‐1.73 ‐4.64 ‐3.66
Output of NEINT ‐0.01 ‐0.77 ‐1.36 ‐1.45 ‐0.79
Output of SVCES 0.27 ‐0.45 ‐0.58 ‐0.30 ‐0.03
Output of manufacturing ‐1.94 ‐2.58 ‐1.91 ‐1.33 ‐1.45
Export of EITE ‐24.25 ‐23.66 ‐5.24 ‐4.35 ‐11.23
Export of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of P_C ‐15.03 ‐14.43 ‐2.87 ‐3.15 ‐16.68
Export of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of TRANS ‐7.47 ‐7.51 ‐3.48 ‐13.30 ‐10.36
Export of NEINT 0.89 0.13 ‐2.28 ‐2.21 ‐1.07
Export of SVCES 11.08 10.30 ‐0.96 ‐0.18 3.72
Export of manufacturing ‐3.38 ‐3.94 ‐2.74 ‐1.56 ‐2.25
Import of EITE 7.87 6.79 0.78 0.72 2.87
Import of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Import of P_C ‐5.99 ‐6.49 ‐8.53 ‐8.72 ‐4.63
Import of FENE ‐22.58 ‐22.67 ‐22.22 ‐22.27 ‐23.11
Import of TRANS 3.68 2.76 1.19 8.13 6.06
Import of NEINT ‐0.64 ‐1.25 0.50 1.46 0.89
Import of SVCES ‐5.25 ‐5.75 ‐0.24 ‐0.34 ‐2.05
Import of manufacturing 0.92 0.32 0.11 0.19 0.73




Table A-3. Small values of Armington elasticity (original value / 2) 
 
JPN (eos_a_s)
AUC GF OBA AO‐EA O ‐ET
CO2 emissions ‐30.47 ‐30.47 ‐30.47 ‐30.47 ‐30.47
Permit price ($/tCO2) 102.72 98.35 134.45 131.93 106.95
Welfare ‐ 0.19 ‐0.45 ‐0.44 ‐0.35 ‐0.26
Real GDP ‐0.10 ‐0.94 ‐0.70 ‐0.51 ‐0.27
Consumption  0.20 ‐1.23 ‐0.88 ‐0.52 ‐0.12
Export ‐ 3.66 ‐4.30 ‐3.56 ‐3.57 ‐3.45
Import ‐ 2.56 ‐3.08 ‐2.57 ‐2.39 ‐2.36
Terms of trade 1.68 1.92 1.53 1.69 1.58
VNPR (bil.$) 85.59 81.94 14.50 46.36 68.41
Labor tax rate (%) 44.06 50.00 50.60 48.00 45.66
Wage rate 1.11 ‐2.25 ‐1.28 ‐0.48 0.39
Labor supply  0.86 ‐0.60 ‐0.08 0.24 0.57
Labor income  1.97 ‐2.83 ‐1.36 ‐0.24 0.97
Total income  0.20 ‐1.23 ‐0.88 ‐0.52 ‐0.12
Leakage rate (%) 17.37 17.22 14.65 14.53 15.41
Output of EITE ‐3.07 ‐3.72 ‐1.90 ‐1.62 ‐1.95
Output of ELY ‐12.73 ‐13.14 ‐4.69 ‐4.52 ‐12.84
Output of P_C ‐14.90 ‐15.17 ‐15.06 ‐15.19 ‐14.95
Output of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output of TRANS ‐2.08 ‐2.92 ‐1.47 ‐3.11 ‐2.48
Output of NEINT ‐1.23 ‐2.04 ‐1.73 ‐1.85 ‐1.49
Output of SVCES 0.18 ‐0.63 ‐0.60 ‐0.32 ‐0.07
Output of manufacturing ‐2.09 ‐2.82 ‐2.23 ‐1.97 ‐1.89
Export of EITE ‐10.27 ‐10.44 ‐3.86 ‐3.55 ‐5.44
Export of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of P_C ‐4.67 ‐4.54 ‐0.94 ‐1.03 ‐4.91
Export of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of TRANS ‐4.31 ‐4.53 ‐2.65 ‐6.94 ‐5.48
Export of NEINT ‐2.60 ‐3.35 ‐3.60 ‐3.70 ‐3.21
Export of SVCES 0.92 0.32 ‐2.38 ‐2.15 ‐1.04
Export of manufacturing ‐3.95 ‐4.62 ‐3.73 ‐3.36 ‐3.44
Import of EITE 1.79 1.12 0.14 0.27 0.84
Import of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Import of P_C ‐8.22 ‐8.70 ‐8.94 ‐9.02 ‐7.86
Import of FENE ‐21.98 ‐22.12 ‐22.00 ‐22.04 ‐22.12
Import of TRANS 0.02 ‐0.84 0.03 0.28 0.33
Import of NEINT 0.59 0.04 0.86 1.11 1.04
Import of SVCES ‐0.40 ‐1.04 0.51 0.71 0.36
Import of manufacturing 0.66 0.16 0.42 0.57 0.74









AUC GF OBA AO‐EA O ‐ET
CO2 emissions ‐30.48 ‐30.48 ‐30.48 ‐30.48 ‐30.48
Permit price ($/tCO2) 99.21 91.77 129.91 128.61 104.90
Welfare ‐ 0.20 ‐0.68 ‐0.64 ‐0.49 ‐0.32
Real GDP 0.18 ‐1.28 ‐1.01 ‐0.63 ‐0.17
Consumption  0.47 ‐2.06 ‐1.63 ‐0.91 ‐0.12
Export ‐ 2.93 ‐3.92 ‐3.21 ‐2.99 ‐2.80
Import ‐ 2.70 ‐3.73 ‐3.01 ‐2.58 ‐2.47
Terms of trade 0.75 0.96 0.78 0.91 0.79
VNPR (bil.$) 82.66 76.46 13.97 45.14 67.08
Labor tax rate (%) 44.01 50.00 51.01 48.21 45.65
Wage rate 0.97 ‐1.98 ‐1.42 ‐0.61 0.28
Labor supply  1.32 ‐1.20 ‐0.63 0.04 0.75
Labor income  2.30 ‐3.16 ‐2.03 ‐0.57 1.04
Total income  0.47 ‐2.06 ‐1.63 ‐0.91 ‐0.12
Leakage rate (%) 20.69 20.31 15.37 15.36 17.00
Output of EITE ‐3.99 ‐4.96 ‐2.15 ‐1.61 ‐2.18
Output of ELY ‐12.56 ‐13.28 ‐5.03 ‐4.65 ‐12.73
Output of P_C ‐15.15 ‐15.61 ‐15.21 ‐15.31 ‐15.37
Output of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output of TRANS ‐2.07 ‐3.51 ‐1.91 ‐3.74 ‐2.78
Output of NEINT ‐0.45 ‐1.87 ‐1.87 ‐1.77 ‐1.10
Output of SVCES 0.45 ‐0.96 ‐0.93 ‐0.46 0.01
Output of manufacturing ‐1.73 ‐2.98 ‐2.33 ‐1.79 ‐1.58
Export of EITE ‐15.61 ‐15.25 ‐4.17 ‐3.61 ‐7.27
Export of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of P_C ‐8.48 ‐7.89 ‐1.50 ‐1.69 ‐9.07
Export of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of TRANS ‐5.11 ‐5.31 ‐2.75 ‐8.91 ‐6.92
Export of NEINT ‐0.77 ‐2.06 ‐3.12 ‐3.00 ‐2.10
Export of SVCES 4.86 3.70 ‐1.85 ‐1.34 0.84
Export of manufacturing ‐3.30 ‐4.37 ‐3.35 ‐2.56 ‐2.69
Import of EITE 3.89 2.42 0.01 0.25 1.54
Import of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Import of P_C ‐7.22 ‐8.10 ‐8.93 ‐8.94 ‐6.67
Import of FENE ‐22.11 ‐22.35 ‐22.11 ‐22.12 ‐22.43
Import of TRANS 1.45 ‐0.18 ‐0.08 2.56 2.22
Import of NEINT 0.15 ‐0.94 0.29 0.94 0.89
Import of SVCES ‐2.08 ‐3.17 ‐0.18 0.10 ‐0.53
Import of manufacturing 0.71 ‐0.30 ‐0.08 0.19 0.64





Table A-5. Small values of EOS between consumption and leisure (original value / 2) 
  
JPN (eos_cl_s)
AUC GF OBA AO‐EA O ‐ET
CO2 emissions ‐30.48 ‐30.48 ‐30.48 ‐30.48 ‐30.48
Permit price ($/tCO2) 97.31 95.16 133.87 130.22 104.27
Welfare ‐ 0.32 ‐0.46 ‐0.47 ‐0.42 ‐0.35
Real GDP ‐0.19 ‐0.60 ‐0.49 ‐0.41 ‐0.28
Consumption ‐ 0.16 ‐0.89 ‐0.71 ‐0.52 ‐0.31
Export ‐ 3.17 ‐3.46 ‐2.84 ‐2.83 ‐2.88
Import ‐ 2.95 ‐3.25 ‐2.63 ‐2.41 ‐2.55
Terms of trade 0.80 0.86 0.71 0.88 0.81
VNPR (bil.$) 81.08 79.29 14.40 45.70 66.68
Labor tax rate (%) 44.51 50.00 50.37 47.93 45.80
Wage rate 0.90 ‐2.49 ‐1.37 ‐0.59 0.26
Labor supply  0.69 ‐0.04 0.29 0.43 0.57
Labor income  1.59 ‐2.52 ‐1.08 ‐0.15 0.83
Total income ‐ 0.16 ‐0.89 ‐0.71 ‐0.52 ‐0.31
Leakage rate (%) 20.51 20.40 15.20 15.27 16.88
Output of EITE ‐4.23 ‐4.51 ‐1.74 ‐1.43 ‐2.26
Output of ELY ‐12.73 ‐12.94 ‐4.56 ‐4.45 ‐12.78
Output of P_C ‐15.27 ‐15.40 ‐15.07 ‐15.25 ‐15.40
Output of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output of TRANS ‐2.43 ‐2.84 ‐1.34 ‐3.53 ‐2.88
Output of NEINT ‐0.81 ‐1.22 ‐1.35 ‐1.56 ‐1.20
Output of SVCES 0.10 ‐0.31 ‐0.42 ‐0.24 ‐0.09
Output of manufacturing ‐2.04 ‐2.40 ‐1.87 ‐1.59 ‐1.68
Export of EITE ‐15.52 ‐15.42 ‐4.08 ‐3.57 ‐7.29
Export of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of P_C ‐8.33 ‐8.16 ‐1.58 ‐1.72 ‐9.02
Export of FENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Export of TRANS ‐5.16 ‐5.22 ‐2.62 ‐8.92 ‐6.92
Export of NEINT ‐1.09 ‐1.46 ‐2.68 ‐2.81 ‐2.19
Export of SVCES 4.57 4.23 ‐1.59 ‐1.23 0.78
Export of manufacturing ‐3.57 ‐3.87 ‐2.95 ‐2.38 ‐2.77
Import of EITE 3.52 3.10 0.46 0.44 1.45
Import of ELY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Import of P_C ‐7.44 ‐7.69 ‐8.66 ‐8.83 ‐6.74
Import of FENE ‐22.17 ‐22.24 ‐22.03 ‐22.09 ‐22.45
Import of TRANS 1.05 0.58 0.51 2.85 2.10
Import of NEINT ‐0.12 ‐0.43 0.71 1.13 0.80
Import of SVCES ‐2.35 ‐2.66 0.29 0.30 ‐0.62
Import of manufacturing 0.46 0.17 0.29 0.35 0.57
Percentage change form BaU unless otherwise indicated.